REITER v. COOPER. AND UNREASONABLE
RATES: ARE REPORTS OF THE FILED RATE
DOCTRINE'S DEATH GREATLY
EXAGGERATED?
HOWARD R. RUBmNt
INTRODUCION

On the eve of the Supreme Court's Reiter v. Cooper decia $27-billion cloud looms ominously above the trucking
industry and those shippers who transport goods with these interstate motor carriers. Throughout the twentieth century the Supreme Court has periodically examined the regulation of motor
carrier pricing schemes; such decisions--coupled with the Interstate
Commerce Commission's policy initiatives-have culminated in
what will be, in all likelihood, shippers' last possible means of
circumventing an inflexible, anachronistic, regulatory regime. The
central concern facing the Reiter Court is whether shippers' use of
an equitable defense, insulating them from severe financial hardship, is compatible with the statutory and judicial framework that
has regulated the motor carrier industry for over a century.
Until the 1980s, carriers and shippers in the trucking industry
conducted their operations within the context of a strict regulatory
scheme established in the late nineteenth century by the Interstate
Commerce Act (ICA).2 The central tenet of this regulatory policy-the filed rate doctrine-requires that motor carriers charge
shippers of goods only those rates that the carriers have filed with
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 3 and that the ICC
sion,1

t I would like to thank Ren6 Sacasas, Associate Professor and Chairman of the
Business Law Department, University of Miami, for his encouragement and guidance.
1. Cooper v. Delaware Valley Shippers (In re Carolina Motor Express), 949 F.2d
107 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub nor. Reiter v. Cooper, 112 S. Ct. 1934 (1992) (No.
91-1496).
2. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 10101-11917 (1988)).
3. Section 10761(a) of the ICA serves as the basis of the filed rate doctrine and
provides in pertinent part:
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has found to be "reasonable." 4 The deregulatory fervor that characterized the 1980s, however, led members of the trucking industry
to distance themselves from the practice of adhering to filed rates.
With the cooperation of the ICC, carriers and shippers began to
negotiate rates privately, most often agreeing on prices lower than
those filed under the ICA. The most important aspect of this ICCconstructed Negotiated Rates policy was the creation of an unreasonable practice defense, designed to ensure that shippers would
only be responsible for payment of the rates privately negotiated
with carriers, not for the higher filed rates.' This practice was well
established by 1990 when the Supreme Court, in its Maislin Industries, U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc. decision,6 reinvigorated the filed
rate doctrine, holding that the unreasonable practice defense was
incompatible with the maintenance of the ICA's regulatory
scheme.7 By refusing to recognize the legality of non-filed rates,
the Court eliminated the shippers' defense against carriers' demands for the difference between the previously collected negotiated rates and the higher filed rates.' The magnitude of the
Maislin victory was not lost upon motor carriers, who need the
approximately $27 billion of undercharges to subsidize unemployed
workers' pension funds.9
[A] carrier providing transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce Commission . . .shall provide that transportation or service only if the rate for the transportation or service is contained in a tariff
that is in effect under this subchapter. That carrier may not charge or receive a
different compensation for that transportation or service than the rate specified
in the tariff ....
4. See 49 U.S.C. § 10701(a) (1988) (requiring that carriers' rates be reasonable).
5. NITL-Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier
Rates (Negotiated Rates 1), 3 LC.C.2d 99 (1986); NITL-Petition to Institute Rulemaking
on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates (Negotiated Rates I), 5 LC.C.2d 623 (1989).
The ICC held that an unreasonable practice is a course of conduct consisting of: "(1)
negotiating a rate; (2) agreeing to a rate that the shipper reasonably relies upon as being
lawfully filed; (3) failing, either willfully or otherwise, to publish the rate; (4) billing, and
accepting payment at the negotiated rate for (sometimes) numerous shipments; and (5)
then demanding additional payments at higher rates." Id.at 628 n.11.
6.

110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990).

7. Id. at 2768.
8. Id.at 2765-66. The motor carrier industry refers to the difference between the
rate filed with the ICC and the lower negotiated rate as the "undercharge." Typically,
undercharge cases arise when trustees for bankrupt
difference between the negotiated rate actually paid
file with the ICC.
9. John D. Shulz, ICC Makes "Conservative"
Billion, TRAFFIC WoRLD, Dec. 16, 1991, at 31, 31.

motor carriers attempt to collect the
by a shipper and the higher rate on
Estimate of Undercharges-Over $27
The figure of $27 billion was com-

piled by adding the potential undercharge liability for 1988, 1989, and 1990. For example,
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Recognizing the devastating effect such litigation could have
on the industry and the impotence of the unreasonable practice
defense, shippers are now attempting to insulate themselves from
this liability by questioning the reasonableness of the filed rates
themselves. A shipper who offers an unreasonable rate defense
asserts that the carrier's filed rate is unreasonable.' The first opportunity the Court had to consider the validity of this alternative
defense came on December 1, 1992, when it heard oral arguments
in Reiter v. Cooper.11
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that an unreasonable rate defense should remain available to those shippers fighting undercharge claims. In so doing, this Note considers three
particular reasons why the Reiter Court should accept the legitimacy of an unreasonable rate defense. Part I establishes rate reasonableness as an integral component of the statutory scheme that
governs the motor carrier industry and of the judicial precedent
that continues to define the parameters within which carriers and
shippers operate. After examining the applicable ICA provisions
and the Supreme Court decisions that shape this area of law, Part
I concludes that to satisfy the primary goal of motor carrier regulation-the prevention of unjust discrimination in carriers' pricing
schemesl--there must be a mechanism designed to ensure that
shippers do not have to pay unreasonable rates. An unreasonable
rate defense, which stays a district court proceeding regarding the
merits of an undercharge dispute pending ICC evaluation of
whether the carrier's rates are reasonable, is the proper mechanism to ensure that shippers pay only those undercharges that are

the ICC estimated that carriers received $14.4 billion in total revenue in 1988 (had filed
rates been adhered to, the figure would have been $21.98 billion). Therefore, from 1988
alone, $7.58 billion in potential liability exists for carriers (or their creditors) to collect.
Id.
10. Because of the predominance of the unreasonable practice defense during the
1980s, it was not until after Maislin that shippers turned their attention to the unreasonable rate defense. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
11. Cooper v. Delaware Valley Shippers (In re Carolina Motor Express), 949 F.2d
107 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub nor. Reiter v. Cooper, 112 S. CL 1934 (1992) (No.
91-1496).
12. See eg., Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922) (noting that
the legislative branch's "paramount purpose" in regulating motor carriers is to prevent
unjust discrimination); see also Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S.
409, 415-17, 424 (1986) (affirming the Court's holding in Keogh that once rates have
been duly submitted with the ICC, these rates become lawful under the ICA).
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based on reasonable rates. Part II focuses on the fact that the
Supreme Court's recent repudiation of the ICC-constructed unreasonable practice defense, coupled with failed congressional attempts to repeal the filed rate doctrine, have left the unreasonable
rate defense as the last possible means for shippers to protect
themselves from incurring complete liability for undercharges.
Nevertheless, mere recognition that rate reasonableness concerns are a central part of the statutory and judicial framework
that governs motor carrier regulation does not sufficiently legitimate the use of an unreasonable rate defense. Likewise, the Reiter
Court should not permit the use of an unreasonable rate defense
simply because shippers have no other alternatives at their disposal. Rather, it is necessary to focus on the unique benefits of such
a defense. Part III focuses on the ways to structure this defense to
provide shippers with adequate protection from undercharge liability while ensuring that a sufficient amount of the $27 billion in
undercharge claims will remain available to supply the pension
funds of bankrupt motor carriers' unemployed workers. In addition, Part III recommends specific tests that district and circuit
courts can apply to determine whether the unreasonable rate defense is consistent with the broad regulatory scheme governing the
motor carrier industry. Implementation of such tests will provide
the safeguards necessary to ensure both that shippers will not be
subjected to unjust pricing discrimination and that the unreasonable rate defense and filed rate doctrine can coexist.
I. RATE REASONABLENESS:
FOUNDATIONS FOR A REGULATORY REGIME

To best understand the body of statutory and judicial law that
presently governs motor carrier regulation, it is first necessary to
consider the primary factor that motivated the creation of the
regulatory policy. Prior to the passage of the ICA in the late
nineteenth century, the public had complained about the discriminatory behavior of the railroads, particularly with regard to setting
rates. 13 Consequently, Congress focused on creating a policy designed to eliminate unjust discrimination in railroad companies'
pricing procedures.'4 The ICA's language reflected the country's
13. See Ren6 Sacasas, The Filed Tariff Doctrine: Casualty or Survivor of Deregula-

tion?, 29 DuQ. L. REV. 1, 7 & n.14 (1990).
14. Although regulations were initially imposed upon the railroads exclusively, such
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determination to rid the railroad industry of the predatory pricing
schemes that larger companies used to price smaller companies out
of the market; section 10741(b) emphatically proclaims that "a
common carrier providing transportation or service subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission... may not* subject a person,15
place, port or type of traffic to unreasonable discrimination.
The Supreme Court quickly echoed Congress's sentiments, noting
that the legislative branch's "paramount purpose" in regulating
motor carriers is to prevent unjust discrimination.16
It is not entirely clear from the text of section 10741(b) what
Congress intended to prohibit when it warned carriers not to create pricing schemes that would unreasonably discriminate among
their customers. Fortunately, the Supreme Court provided substantial guidance in one of its earliest rate reasonableness decisions
when it held that the ICA's main purpose is to "secure equality of
rates as to all and to destroy favoritism, these last being accomplished by requiring the publication of tariffs and by prohibiting
secret departures from such tariffs, and forbidding rebates, preferences and all other forms of undue discrimination."" It is only
against this backdrop-rooted in a desire to establish equal rates
and to remove favoritism from carriers' pricing practices-that one
can effectively analyze the importance of the ICA's provisions.
This concern for equality and fairness that sparked the initial
regulation of motor carrier pricing schemes also manifested itself
in the rate reasonableness language that guided the construction of
the ICA and the early-twentieth-century Supreme Court decisions
interpreting -the ICA. To realize its goal of eliminating motor
carriers' discriminatory practices, Congress had to construct the
ICA in a way that conveyed the importance of fair pricing
schemes. Section 10701(a) fulfills this purpose by stating that "a
rate ...

classification, rule, or practice related to transportation or

service provided by a carrier subject to the jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce Commission... must be reasonable."8 To

policies were ultimately absorbed into the regulatory law governing the other components
of the transportation industry. For further consideration of the historical development of
regulation of the railroad industry, see id at 6-16.
15. 49 U.S.C. § 10741(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
16. Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922).
17. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361, 391 (1906).
18. 49 U.S.C. § 10701(a) (1988) (emphasis added). Similar reasonableness requirements are found in the governing statutes of other industries as well. See e.g., Natu-

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:905

provide more specific guidelines, Congress created section 10701(e)
to detail the method the ICC should use in assessing the reasonableness of rates.19 Rate levels that are "adequate under honest,
economical, and efficient management to cover total operating
expenses ... plus a reasonable profit" will be authorized.P
To ensure that motor carrier pricing practices do not violate
section 10741(b)'s prohibition against unjust discrimination, Congress deemed it necessary to include in the ICA more specific

regulations that would go beyond the mere rate reasonableness
requirement. The ICA's filed rate doctrine has been the touchstone of much congressional regulation since the early twentieth
century,21 "forbid[ing] a regulated entity [from charging] rates for
its services other than those properly filed with the appropriate
federal regulatory authority."' Section 10762(a) states that "a
motor common carrier shall publish and file with the Commission
tariffs containing the rates for transportation it may provide under
this subtitle."' The Supreme Court has continually reasserted the
importance of enforcing the filed rate doctrine and has ruled that
the published rate is "made, for all purposes, the legal rate, as
between carrier and shipper."' The fastidiousness with which the

ral Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1988) (requiring that all rates charged by a natural gas
company for the transportation or sale of gas be "just and reasonable").
19. 49 U.S.C. § 10701(e) (1988) (requiring the ICC to conduct an economic evaluation of the challenged rate in the context of the motor carrier's costs).
20. Id. Like the ICA, the Natural Gas Act requires rates to be evaluated in light of
pipelines' costs. See 18 C.F.R. § 154.63 (1992) (requiring that the filing of rates and rate
changes in tariffs be supported by detailed cost information).
21. Other regulated industries are governed by similar provisions. See, eg., Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c) (1988) (requiring utilities to rile rate schedules with the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). Such a provision prohibits "a regulated seller of
[power] from collecting a rate other than the one filed with the Commission ......
Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 578 (1981).
22. Arkansas Louisiana Gas, 453 U.S. at 577. Although initially developed to regulate
the railroad industry, the filed rate doctrine has become an integral component in the
regulation of other areas of the transportation industry, such as the motor carrier sector.
The energy and telecommunication industries also rely on the filed rate doctrine as support for their regulatory schemes. Arkansas Louisiana Gas, for example, involved federal
regulation of natural gas prices. 14 at 577-78. See generally Sacasas, supra note 13, at 2
nn.2-3 (providing a succinct history of the filed rate doctrine as it applies to the energy
and telecommunications industries).
23. 49 U.S.C. § 10762(a) (1988).
24. Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922); see also Baldwin v.
Scott County Milling Co., 307 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1939); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v.
Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336, 343-44 (1982); Thurston Motor Lines v. Jordan K.
Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983).
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Court has repeated this message reflects its desire to deter carriers
from intentionally misquoting rates to shippers as a means of
offering rebates or discounts to favored shippers.'
The combination of requiring that motor carriers not charge
rates other than those filed with the ICC and requiring that those
rates be reasonable is the ICA's chief means of preventing unreasonable discrimination in the motor carrier industry. Rather than
considering these two requirements as wholly independent, section
10761(a)'s filed rate restriction should be viewed as derivative of
section 10701(a)'s broader reasonableness requirement. Because
section 10761(a) expressly limits acceptable rates to those included
in a carrier's tariff, it would be unreasonable-andtherefore contrary to the express requirements of section 10701(a)-to enforce
any non-tariff rate. Consequently, compliance with the filed rate
requirement is a necessary condition for fulfillment of the ICA's
reasonableness requirement.26
The Supreme Court recognized the symbiotic nature of the
rate reasonableness and filed rate requirements in a series of early-twentieth-century decisions.' The Court's clearest articulation
of the filed rate doctrine and how closely it is related to rate
reasonableness came in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v.
Maxwell.' In forbidding shippers from avoiding filed rates, the
Maxwell Court held that
[u]nder the Interstate Commerce Act, the rate of the carrier duly
filed is the only lawful charge. Deviation from it is not permitted
upon any pretext. Shippers ... as well as ... carrier[s] must
abide by it, unless it is found by the Comission to be unreasonable .... This rule is undeniably strict and it obviously may
work hardship in some cases, but it embodies the policy which
has been adopted by Congress in the regulation of interstate

25. Louisville & Nashville RR. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915).
26. Note, however, that compliance with § 10761(a) is not a sufficient condition of
the § 10701(a) rate reasonableness requirement. Rather, a rate is only considered reasonable if, in addition to its being a filed rate, it also passes the economic evaluation
conducted under § 10701(e).
27. Se4 e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440-42
(1907) (noting that an "indissoluble unity" exists between filed rate and reasonableness
requirements); Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 81 (1908) ("If the
rates are subject to secret alteration by special agreement, then the statute will fail of its
purpose to establish a rate duly published, known to all, and from which neither shipper
nor carrier may depart.").
28. 237 U.S. 94 (1915).
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commerce in order to prevent unjust discrimination. 29
No judicial opinion since Maxwell has been as effective in crystallizing the nexus between rate reasonableness and the filing of
motor carrier rates. Maxwell's synthesis of sections 10701(a) and
10761(a) offers the most cogent insight into what the regulatory
regime defining the motor carrier industry is designed to accomplish-the assurance that shippers and carriers will only operate
under filed, reasonable rates.
Rate reasonableness has also played a significant role in the
distinction that the Court has drawn between rates that are merely
legal and those that are lawful as well as legal. Although the legality of a given rate is satisfied by strict adherence to section
10761(a), a determination of that rate's lawfulness can be made
only after its reasonableness is considered. In Arizona Grocery Co.
v. Atchison T. & S.F. Railway Co.,' the Court made clear that
rate reasonableness is an integral component of the ICA's regulatory scheme: "Although the Act thus created a legal rate, it did
not abrogate, but expressly affirmed, the common-law duty to
charge no more than a reasonable rate ....

In other words, the

legal rate was not made by the statute a lawful rate-it was lawful
only if it was reasonable."31 This pronouncement elevated section
10701(a) to a prominent position in motor carrier regulation and
indicated that filing rates with the ICC in compliance with section
10761(a) addresses only one aspect of the ICA's regulatory
scheme.2 A carrier's price is not lawful unless it satisfies the rate
reasonableness requirement.33
Two possibilities exist for the handling of rate reasonableness
evaluations. One possibility is to have district courts stay undercharge proceedings, refer the question of rate reasonableness to
the ICC, and then determine the merits of the undercharge claim
29. Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
30. 284 U.S. 370 (1932).
31. Id. at 384. In fact, seventeen years before Arizona Grocery, the Court had already begun to link the concepts of rate reasonableness and lawful charges to one another. See Maxwell, 237 U.S. at 97 ("[T]he rate of the carrier duly filed is the only lawful
charge . .. unless it is found by the Commission to be unreasonable.") (emphasis added).

32. The concept of reasonableness articulated in § 10701(a) is not limited to rates
alone, but refers also to transportation practices. Although early Supreme Court decisions
dealt solely with rate reasonableness, the unreasonable practice concept became the center of litigation during the 1980s. For further discussion of this point, see infra Section

1(A).
33.

Arizona Grocery, 284 U.S. at 384.
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only if the ICC finds that the given rate is reasonable. Another
possibility requires shippers to pay the undercharge claim without
knowing if the rate against which the undercharge is measured is
reasonable. Questions regarding rate reasonableness would be
raised only later, in a separate reparations proceeding conducted
by the ICC.
This issue of when the courts or the ICC should make a determination of rate reasonableness is currently the main issue
concerning rate reasonableness. The Reiter Court will determine
whether rate reasonableness can be raised in undercharge suits as
a defense to carriers' undercharge claims. If this unreasonable rate
defense is upheld, the courts would refer the reasonableness issue
to the ICC. Under this referral system, district courts would be
powerless to rule on the merits of undercharge disputes until the
ICC has concluded its investigations---thereby preventing carriers
from receiving any money from shippers until after the ICC has
determined the reasonableness of the filed rates. From the
shippers' perspective, the significant advantage of this process is
that undercharge liability will have to be paid only if the ICC
makes an initial determination that the rates are reasonable. Without such a defense mechanism, shippers' sole chance of limiting
their liability would be in reparations proceedings occurring only
after they have already paid the carriers. Considering that the
majority of undercharge claims pending in state and federal courts
have been brought by the trustees of bankrupt motor carriers,
shippers desperately want to avoid claiming reparations as unsecured creditors.'
In determining whether a referral or reparations system should
be used, one particular question must be answered: Which procedure is most faithful to the statutory and judicial regime that has
dominated motor carrier regulation throughout the twentieth century? The Supreme Court's motor carrier rate decisions, particularly those from the early part of this century, make clear that the
Court placed great emphasis on carrier rates' being reasonable.'
34. For a discussion of the impact that bankruptcy proceedings have on undercharge
cases, see, e.g., Cooper v. Delaware Valley Shippers (In re Carolina Motor Express), 949
F.2d 107, 113 (4th Cir. 1991) (Hall, L, dissenting), cerL granted sub non. Reiter v. Cooper, 112 S. Ct. 1934 (1992) (No. 91-1496). Although it is beyond the scope of this Note
to consider bankruptcy law's impact on shippers' reparations claims, the vigor with which
shippers are fighting for an unreasonable rate defense provides substantial insight into
how much weaker a position those companies see themselves in as unsecured creditors.
35. See eg., Arizona Grocery, 284 U.S. at 370; Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
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If the Reiter Court only permits shippers to guard against unreasonable rates within the context of reparations proceedings, the
distinct possibility exists that carriers will receive undercharges that
have been determined based on unreasonable rates. As the Arizona Grocery Court noted, a rate is only lawful if it is reasonable.3
Therefore, to ensure that carriers and shippers function only under
lawful pricing schemes, it is critical that reasonableness determinations are made prior to the exchange of any money. The unreasonable rate defense guarantees that Congress's and the Court's
most immediate concern of eliminating rate discrimination will
always be addressed. More important, as Part II makes clear, this
defense provides shippers with their only hope of avoiding the $27
billion of undercharges that carriers are attempting to collect.

II. RATE REASONABLENESS UNTESTED:
JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS

Although the rate reasonableness requirement historically has
been one of the most significant constraints upon motor carrier
pricing schemes, other considerations dominated motor carrier
regulation during the 1980s. The ultimate failure of these recent
initiatives-namely, the ICC-constructed unreasonable practice
defense and congressional attempts to repeal the filed rate doctrine-has left the unreasonable rate defense as the only
mechanism available to insulate shippers from mounting undercharge liability. Rate reasonableness, virtually ignored during the
past decade, takes on added significance when one considers the
impact of the Supreme Court's Maislin Industries, U.S. v. Primary
Steel, Inc. decision' and corresponding congressional actions. This
Part first focuses on the ephemeral unreasonable practice defense;
it then considers the reasons why shippers are unlikely to find any
congressional protection from undercharge liability.
A.

The Rise and Fall of the UnreasonablePractice Defense

It is as important to analyze the development of the ICCconstructed unreasonable practice defense as it is to consider the
implications of its June 1990-dismissal. The first part of this Sec-

Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94 (1915).
36. 284 U.S. at 384.
37. 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990).
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tion considers the changes in ICC policy following passage of the
Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA), 38 focusing attention on the
Commission's Negotiated Rates decisions. Shortly after the ICC had
completed its construction of the unreasonable practice defense,
the Maislin Court razed the entire project. The second part of this
Section considers the Maislin litigation, specifically addressing the
Court's dismissal of the unreasonable practices concept.
1. The Rise of Unreasonable Practices: ICC Development. As discussed earlier, for nearly a century, regulatory policy
has been dominated by two principles: First, as described in section 10761(a) of the ICA, carriers could charge only those rates
that were on file with the ICC; and second, carriers could charge
only rates found to be "reasonable" under section 10701(a). It was
only after the passage of the MCA that significant changes in
regulatory policy developed.39 In an attempt "to promote competitive and efficient transportation services," the MCA relaxed the
regulations surrounding motor carriers' pricing schemes.' The
MCA did not, however, repeal the filed rate doctrine. Instead, the
modified statutory framework merely allowed shippers and carriers
to conduct business more flexibly within a larger regulated environment.4 ' Interestingly, the ICC's response to the MCA's passage, not the Act itself, had the most profound impact on motor
carrier regulation.
The ICC viewed the partial deregulation of the industry as an
opportunity to redefine completely its regulatory policies. Invoking
the "post-Motor Carrier Act of 1980 environment,"'4 2 the ICC
38. Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793.
39. An examination of the unreasonable rate defense's merits can be made without
considering the MCA's impact on the motor carrier industry. Because this Note is concerned with demonstrating the legitimacy of the unreasonable rate defense, it is more
valuable to concentrate on the history of the unreasonable practice defense (starting with
its conception in the Negotiated Rates decisions and ending with its demise in Maislin)
than on the 1980 legislation. For a discussion of deregulation's impact on the motor
carrier industry, see Ren6 Sacasas & Nicholas A. Glaskowsky, Jr., Motor CarrierDeregulation: A Decade of Legal and Economic Conflict, 18 TRANSp. LJ. 189, 191-92 (1990).
40. Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793, § 4 (formerly codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(7) (1976 ed., supp. V)).
41. See Maislin Indus., U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2772 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that although the MCA plainly reflects "an intent to
deregulate, it reflects an intent to deregulate within the framework of the existing statutory
scheme").
42. NITL-Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier
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determined that its pre-1980 "policy of applying Section 10761
strictly regardless of the circumstances [was] inappropriate and
unnecessary to deter discrimination today., 43 Further, recognizing
that the Supreme Court's steadfast application of the filed rate
doctrine prevented shippers from asserting any legal defense to a
carrier's attempt to collect the filed rates, the ICC developed a
policy that permitted shippers to assert equitable defenses.'
Known collectively as the Negotiated Rates doctrine, the ICC's
newly formulated policy was based on the idea that "in the highly
competitive motor carrier industry ...

equitable defenses to rigid

application 45of filed tariff rates should be available on a case-bycase basis.,
Although it turned to section 10701(a) for support for its
newly developed policy, the ICC did not direct its attention to the
rate reasonableness requirement. Instead, the ICC relied on that
section's previously overlooked requirement that a carrier's practices be reasonable. Without the benefit of any judicial precedent
concerning this portion of section 10701(a), the ICC determined
that a carrier commits an unreasonable practice when it: (1) negotiates a rate; (2) agrees to a rate that the shipper has reasonably
relied upon as having been lawfully filed; (3) fails, willfully or
otherwise, to publish the rate; (4) bills and accepts payment at the
negotiated rate for (sometimes) numerous shipments; and (5) de46
mands additional payments at higher rates.
Although section 10701(a)'s prohibition of unreasonable practices had never previously been invoked by the courts or the Commission to strike down as unlawful a given carrier's filed rates, the
ICC believed it was necessary to develop an equitable defense that
would counter what it considered to be unreasonable motor carrier
practices.47 Negotiated Rates offered hope to wary shippers who
were facing an explosion in undercharge litigation. The ICC policy
created a means by which shippers could circumvent the previously

Rates (Negotiated Rates 1), 3 I.C.C.2d 99 (1986).

43. Id. at 106.
44. See id at 99; NrTL-Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates (Negotiated Rates If), 5 LC.C.2d 623 (1989) (stating that the ICC
would accept initial jurisdiction of negotiated rate-undercharge cases without awaiting
court referral).
45. Negotiated Rates 1, 3 I.C.C.2d at 106.
46. Negotiated Rates II, 5 LC.C.2d at 628 n.11.

47.

ld.
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unassailable filed rate requirement of section 10761(a) without
having to demonstrate that the carrier's rates were unreasonable.
Essentially, Negotiated Rates provided shippers with a second way
to avoid the payment of undercharges based on carriers' filed
rates. Ironically, the newly formed unreasonable practice defense,
and not a defense based on the more frequently tested concept of
rate reasonableness, dominated undercharge litigation in the 1980s.
In fact, the ICC recently noted that, subsequent to the MCA and
prior to the Supreme Court's dismissal of the unreasonable practice defense in 1990, there were no motor carrier rate reasonableness decisions.'
Only three years after the ICC had issued its initial Negotiated
Rates opinion, questions began to surface regarding the legitimacy
of the unreasonable practice defense, 9 and the ICC had to justify
its policy initiative vigorously. The ICC insisted that the filed rate
requirement of section 10761(a) was "only part of an overall regulatory scheme; [and] ... should not be elevated over the unreasonable practices provision of section 10701.2"o Rather than viewing section 10761 as the touchstone of motor carrier regulation, as
the Supreme Court had done throughout the twentieth century,
the ICC's Negotiated Rates policy created a new balance indicating
that strict adherence to filed rates was not more central to the
overall regulatory scheme than was the reasonableness of carriers'
rates and practices. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, finding this position untenable, offered a reply which
symbolized the beginning of the end for the unreasonable practice
defense:
A shipper that pleads unreasonableness as a defense cannot
prevent enforcement of the filed tariff doctrine .... Any other
decision would constitute legislation on our part; it would create
48. General Mills, Inc.-Petition for Declaratory Order--Certain Rates and Practices
of United Shipping Company, Inc., 3 Fed. Carr. Rep. (CCH)

47,593 (ICC 1992).

49. The Fifth Circuit expressed its belief that an unreasonable practice exception to
the filed rate doctrine would, in effect, destroy the entire regulatory scheme. Supreme
Beef Processors v. Yaquinto (In re Caravan Refrigerated Cargo), 864 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3254 (1990). But see Maislin Indus., U.S. v. Primary Steel,
Inc., 879 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1989) (viewing Negotiated Rates as a justified policy modifica-

tion consistent with the ICC's practices under the ICA rather than as an abandonment of
the filed rate doctrine), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990).

50. Negotiated Rates II, 5 I.C.C.2d at 627. The tension between §§ 10761 and 10701
became a key issue in the Supreme Court's Maislin decision. See infra notes 74-80 and

accompanying text.
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an exception that swallows the doctrine and thereby would vitiate

a long-standing and notorious policy which Congress has visited
and left intact.51

Despite the incisiveness of the Fifth Circuit's opinion, several other
circuits chose to uphold the validity of the unreasonable practice
defense.52 Consequently, it was left to the Supreme Court, in
Maislin Industries, U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 3 to determine
whether the ICC's Negotiated Rates policy in general, and the
unreasonable practice defense in particular, would continue to
coexist with section 10701(a)'s rate reasonableness requirement as
a means for shippers to counter carriers' undercharge claims.
2. The Fall of UnreasonablePractices:Justice Brennan's Blueprint. Following a description of what occurred in the initial stages of the Maislin litigation, this subsection analyzes the Supreme
Court's rejection of the unreasonable practice defense. It focuses
first on the Maislin Court's attempt to determine the relative importance of sections 10701(a) and 10761(a). Then it considers the
Court's interpretation of the MCA and the effect of this on the
filed rate doctrine. Finally, this subsection's examination of developments in the Maislin litigation after the Court remanded the
case to the Eighth Circuit provides the springboard for a discussion of how shippers are attempting to protect themselves from
undercharge claims now that the unreasonable practice defense is
no longer a viable option.

51.

Caravan, 864 F.2d at 392. The Fifth Circuit's final point-that Congress had

visited and chosen to leave the filed rate policy intact-is a reference to the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. Presumably, by modifying the regulatory structure of the motor carrier
industry without eliminating strict adherence to filed rates under § 10761(a), see supra
notes 39-41 and accompanying text, Congress expressed its desire to preserve the filed
rate doctrine. See also Maislin, 110 S. Ct. at 2771 (inferring a congressional intent to
eradicate the filed rate doctrine based upon the relaxation of regulation in specific and
limited circumstances-namely through the exemption provided contract carriers-ignores
the plain language of the ICA which Congress "has deliberately chosen not to disturb . . . with respect to motor common carriers").

52. See, eg., Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines v. Zenith Elec. Corp., 899 F.2d 642 (7th
Cir.), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 111 S. Ct. 334 (1990); West Coast Truck Lines
v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 893 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir.), withdrawn, 912 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1990);
Delta Traffic Serv. v. Appco Paper & Plastics, 893 F.2d 472 (2d Cir.), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990); Seaboard Sys. R.R. v. United States, 794 F.2d

635 (l1th Cir. 1986).
53.

110 S. Ct 2759 (1990).

FILED RATE DOCTRINE

1993]

Maislin is paradigmatic of typical undercharge litigation: A
carrier negotiates rates lower than those in its filed tariff, fails to
file the negotiated rates with the ICC, and, in the process of subsequent bankruptcy proceedings, files a claim to collect the undercharges from the shipper. The Maislin litigation arose from an
action filed by Quinn Freight Lines, Inc., a subsidiary of Maislin
Industries, for the collection of freight rate undercharges. From
January 1981 through mid-1983, Quinn transported 1,081 shipments
for Primary Steel, Inc., charging rates that were lower than those
Quinn had on file with the ICC.54 In July 1983, Maislin Industries

filed for bankruptcy.55 A subsequent audit of its accounts revealed that Quinn had undercharged Primary Steel by $187,923.36
on the shipments. 6 The bankruptcy trustee then billed Primary
Steel for the difference between the amounts previously billed and
paid and those prescribed by the tariff rates on file with the
ICC.Y Upon Primary Steel's refusal to pay the amounts demanded, the Maislin estate filed an action pursuant to section 11706(a)
of the ICA58 to recover the undercharges.59
In light of the ICC's existing Negotiated Rates policy, Primary
Steel asserted three independent defenses: first, that the practice of
negotiating rates lower than the filed tariff rates and rebilling at
the higher rates was unreasonable; second, that the rates sought
were unreasonable,' and third, "that the asserted tariff rates
were otherwise inapplicable to the shipments at issue."'61 Finding
that these defenses raised issues within the "primary jurisdiction" 62 of the ICC, the district court stayed the proceedings and
referred the matter to the Commission.63 The ICC ruled in favor
of Primary Steel, concluding that Quinn's negotiation of a non-

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 2764.
Id.
Id.
Id.

58. 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a) (1982).

59. 705 F. Supp. 1401 (W.D. Mo. 1988) aff'd, 879 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1989), revd,
110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990).
60. Maislin, 110 S. Ct. at 2764. This second defense-unreasonable rates-soon disappeared from the litigation and did not resurface for nearly three years. See infra notes
87-91 and accompanying text.
61. 110 S. Ct. at 2764.
62. For a discussion of the primary jurisdiction doctrine and its impact upon the
judicio-administrative balance created in undercharge legislation, see infra Section III(A).
63.. 110 S. CL at 2764.
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filed rate and subsequent attempt to collect undercharges constituted an unreasonable practice.' The ICC referred the case back to
the district court without considering the inherent reasonableness
of the filed rates.' The district court then granted,' and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed,67 summary judgment in favor of Primary
Steel. The district court's reasoning in awarding summary judgment, although quite predictable in light of the ICC's findings, is
of great importance: "In sum, we find and conclude that the
Commission's determination that a negotiated rate existed and that
the collection of the alleged undercharges would be an unreasonable and unlawful practice is supported by substantial evidence and
thus should be affirmed."
The early Maislin litigation-specifically, the ICC and district
court determinations-is typical of undercharge litigation prior to
the Supreme Court's 1990 decision. District courts had referred
numerous cases to the ICC for consideration of unreasonable practice and unreasonable rate defenses. However, because of the
existence of the Negotiated Rates policy and its clearly defined
unreasonable practice defense, the ICC had been determining
whether undercharge claims should be allowed without considering
shippers' unreasonable rate defenses. It was not until after the Supreme Court disposed of the unreasonable practice defense in
Maislin6 9 that shippers remembered that the district courts had
sent two defenses to the ICC for consideration.7'
In reversing the Eighth Circuit's decision, the Court held 7-2
that "the filed rate governs the legal relationship between shipper
and carrier.",71 Consequently, the Court stated that the ICC's Negotiated Rates policy-which relieved a shipper from the obligation

64. Id. at 2764-65.
65. Id. at 2765.
66. 705 F. Supp. 1401, 1407 (W.D. Mo. 1988), affd, 879 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1989),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990).
67. 879 F.2d 400, 406 (8th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990).
68. 705 F. Supp. at 1407 (emphasis added).
69. 110 S. Ct. at 2768.
70. For a discussion of litigation engendered by the unreasonable rate defense, see
infra Part III.
71. 110 S. Ct. at 2765. This statement reaffirmed the Court's ongoing commitment to
the preeminence of the filed rate doctrine in motor carrier regulatory policy. See Texas
& Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 439 (1907); Keogh v. Chicago
& Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 416 (1986).
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of paying the filed rate when the shipper and carrier had privately
negotiated a lower rate-undermined the basic structure of the
ICA.' Noting that the ICC's finding focused on the unreasonableness of the carrier's practice rather than on the sensibility of
the filed rates, Justice Brennan stated: "We have never held that a
carrier's unreasonable practice justifies departure from the filed
tariff schedule."' The Court continued its assault on the Negotiated Rates policy on two independent levels. First, it held very different views from those of the ICC of the relationship between
sections 10761 and 10701 and of the sections' relative importance
to the filed rate doctrine. Second, it rejected the ICC's attempt to
expand the deregulatory tendencies of the MCA beyond justifiable
limits, arguing that such a task is in Congress's domain and cannot
be accomplished by an administrative agency.74
According to the Court, the ICC's interpretation of unreasonable practices was "flatly inconsistent with the statutory scheme as
a whole,... and §§ 10761 and 10762 in particular."' Allowing
the ICC to determine the reasonableness of carrier practices under
section 10701(a) would amount to excusing the requirements of
section 10761(a)-that the carrier "may not charge or receive a
different compensation ...
than the rate specified in the tariff ... ." For the Court, unlike for the ICC, the filed rate requirement was more than just a part of an overall regulatory scheme.7 6
On the contrary, requiring strict adherence to filed rates provided
the Court with the necessary means for ensuring that section
10741-prohibiting unjust discrimination in motor carrier pricing-would not be overlooked. 7 Moreover, the Court admonished

72. 110 S. Ct. at 2769. Specifically, "[b]y refusing to order collection of the filed rate
solely because the parties have agreed to a lower rate, the ICC has permitted the very
price discrimination the Act by its terms seeks to prevent." Id. at 2768.
73. Id. at 2767. In Louisville & Nashville R-R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 100
(1915), for example, it had been the unreasonableness of a carrier's rate-not prac-

tice-that operated as a caveat to the filed rate rule. See supra text accompanying note
29; see also Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577-78 (1981) (emphasizing that
the purpose of the filed rate doctrine is first, to preserve the regulating agency's authority to determine the reasonableness of rates, and second, to insure that the regulated

entities
74.
75.
76.

charge only those rates approved of by the agency).
Maislin, 110 S.Ct. at 2771.
Id. at 2768 (citations omitted).
See Ud at 2769 (noting that adherence to the filed rate requirements of §§ 10761

and 10762 is "utterly central" to the administration of the ICA).

77. Since the Court's frst interpretation of the ICA in the early twentieth century,
prevention of discriminatory pricing has been of central concern. As the Court noted in
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that the ICA "forbids as discriminatory the secret negotiation and
collection of rates lower than the filed rate."'78 Justice Brennan
observed that "[s]tripped of its semantic cover, the Negotiated
Rates policy and, more specifically, the Commission's interpretation
6f 'unreasonable practices' . . . [are] flatly inconsistent with the
statutory scheme as a whole ... 2 9 The ICC's premise that a
carrier's unreasonable practices could create an exception to the

previously unassailable filed rates doctrine was thereby rejected by
the Court.'

The Court further noted that if the reasons underlying the
filed rate doctrine were no longer sound, Congress, not the courts
or the ICC, should change the policy." Congress had not demonstrated an intent to permit motor common carriers, shippers, or
the ICC to undermine the statutory tariff adherence require-

ments.' Instead, Congress defined specific and limited circumstances in which the filed rate doctrine is not applicable. 3 The
ICC's unreasonable practice defense, created to circumvent the
strict requirements of section 10761(a), ignored the plain language
of the ICA.' Therefore, the Maislin Court overruled the Negoti-

Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908):
[The Act] has provided for the establishing of one rate ...and that rate to be
while in force the only legal rate. Any other construction of the statute opens
the doors to the possibility of the very abuses of unequal rates which it was
the design of the statute to prohibit and punish.
Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
78. 110 S.Ct at 2768.
79. Id. (citations omitted).
80. In a footnote important for future litigation, the Court did recognize, however,
that the ICC had not determined whether the tariff rates were reasonable. Id. at 2767
n.10. It is not surprising, in light of Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Maxwell's concern
for the reasonableness of rates, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915), that the Maislin Court held that
"[tihe issue of the reasonableness of the tariff rates is open for exploration on remand."
110 S.Ct. at 2767 n.10. A salvo had been fired-and shippers breathed a sigh of relief
as they realized that although round one had gone the carriers' way, footnote 10 signalled that there could (and would) be a round two.
81. 110 S.Ct. at 2771. For a consideration of such congressional attempts, see infra
Section B.
82. Had Congress desired to carve exceptions into, or even to eliminate, these requirements, it could have easily done so, as it had done for motor contract carriers in §
10761(b) of the ICA. 49 U.S.C. § 10761(b) (1988) (permitting the ICC to "grant relief
from subsection (a) of this section to contract carriers when relief is consistent with the
public interest and the transportation policy of section 10101 of this title.").
83. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10708 (a)(2)(d), (a)(4) (1988) (creating a zone of rate freedom to allow carriers to raise and lower rates without ICC interference).
84. The Maislin Court concluded that Congress is aware of the exception provided
contract carriers and "has deliberately chosen not to disturb it with respect to motor
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ated Rates policy as an attempt to deregulate the industry beyond
the levels achieved by the MCA, reversed the Eighth Circuit's
decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings.'
On remand, the Eighth Circuit denied Primary Steel's subsequent motion to refer the case to the ICC and remanded the case
because the district court was in the best position to consider
reference to the ICC. 6 The district court noted that the ICC's
consideration in 1988 of Primary Steel's equitable defenses addressed only whether requiring Primary Steel to pay the difference
between the negotiated rate and the higher tariff rate would constitute an unreasonable practice." Citing Justice Brennan's tenth
footnote in the Maislin decision, the district court made clear that
all hope was not lost for the shipper:
Primary Steel's reasonableness claim is an entirely separate issue
than its negotiated rate claim. Under the latter, the issue is
whether Maislin is equitably estopped from claiming undercharges
when it negotiated for and was paid a lesser rate. Under the
[rate] reasonableness claim, it must be determined whether
Maislin's published tariff rate was reasonable within the meaning
of 49 U.S.C. § 10701(a) in light of the factors and standards of
49 U.S.C. § 10701(e).88
Thus, post-Maislin undercharge litigation began to take form
in the District Court for the Western District of Missouri and in
other courts.89 Although section 10701(a) of the ICA suggests
that practices related to carriers' transportation services must be
reasonable, the concept of rate reasonableness-far more central
both to the ICA and to controlling Supreme Court precedent 9°common carriers." 110 S. Ct. at 2771.
85. Id.
86.

87.
264536
88.
89.

Maislin Indus., U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 911 F.2d 1312 (8th Cir. 1990).

Maislin Indus., U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., No. 85-0021-CV-W-JWO-5, 1990 WL
(W.D. Mo. 1990).
Id. at *2.
A general pattern began to develop in this type of litigation: Shipper X had

initially obtained from a district court an order staying the carrier's suit and referring the
unreasonable practice defense to the ICC. Thereafter, the Supreme Court invalidated the
ICC's Negotiated Rates policy and precluded an unreasonable practice defense to a motor

carrier's suit to collect unpaid freight charges. In light of Maislin, shipper X now seeks
leave to exchange its unreasonable practice defense for an unreasonable rate defense. See,
e.g., Duffy v. BMC Indus., 938 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1991); Horn's Motor Express v. Harrisburg Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 211 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Covey v. Conagra Inc., 758 F.
Supp. 644 (D. Colo.), amended, 763 F. Supp. 479 (D. Colo. 1991).
90. To gain statutory legitimacy for its Negotiated Rates policy, the ICC continually

924
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provides shippers with their only remaining hope of counteracting
the seemingly clear pronouncements of the filed rate doctrine. 9'
B.

CongressionalResponses to Undercharge Litigation

A rate reasonableness defense represents shippers' last chance
for protection from undercharge liability, not only because of the
Maislin Court's refusal to accept the unreasonable practice defense, but also because of Congress's inability to repeal the remnants of the regulatory scheme that burdens -shippers.' This congressional inaction is not due to any perceived lack of authority or
the dictates of the Maislin Court. In fact, the Maislin Court indi-

cated that Congress, and not an administrative agency, is the one
to undo the filed rate doctrine.'

Thus, selecting the means to

resolve the undercharge problem is Congress's responsibility. 94

had to refer to § 10701(a)'s admonition against unreasonable practices. See, e.g., Negotiated Rates 1, 3 I.C.C.2d 99, 107-08 (1986); Negotiated Rates II, 5 I.C.C.2d 623, 627 (1989).
Ironically, once one reads past the opening sentence of § 10701(a), the remainder of
§ 10701 is devoted entirely to clarification of rate reasonableness. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 10701(c) (1988) (prohibiting discrimination in one carrier's rates against another carrier's
connecting lines); id. § 10701(d) (limiting the type of evidence that may be used in determining rate reasonableness); id. § 10701(e) (providing standards by which the Commission can evaluate the economic validity of a challenged rate).
Similarly, when the Supreme Court has sought to qualify the requirement of strictly
adhering to filed rates, it has been concerned foremost with the reasonableness of
carriers' rates, not with their practices. See, eg., Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 384 (1932) (expressing the "common-law duty to charge no
more than a reasonable. rate") (emphasis added); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915) ("[T]he rate of the carrier duly filed is the only lawful
charge .

. .

. Shippers and travelers are charged with notice of it, and they as well as

the carrier must abide by it, unless it is found by the Commission to be unreasonable.")
(emphasis added).
91. Shippers did not miss this point after the Court's Maislin decision, and they
began to seek referral to the ICC on the rate reasonableness issue. See, eg., Horn's
Motor Express, 765 F. Supp at 217; Oneida Motor Freight v. Ormond Shops, Inc., 126
B.R. 431, 433-35 (D.N.J. 1991); Overland Express v. International Multifoods, 765 F.
Supp. 1386, 1388 (S.D. Ind. 1990); see also Petition for Issuance of Rate Reasonableness
and Unreasonable Practices Policy Statement, 3 Fed. Carr. Rep. (CCH)
37,909, at
47,415 n.2 (ICC 1991) (recognizing that since the rejection of the Negotiated Rates policy,
there has been an increase in the number of rate reasonableness defenses being asserted
in the courts and in front of the ICC).
92. Part of that task has already been accomplished by, the Motor Carrier Act of
1980. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
93. Maislin Indus., U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2771 (1990). Moreover, Justice Brennan intimated that strict adherence to the provisions of the filed rate
doctrine may have become anachronistic in light of present deregulatory policies. Id.
94. Since Maislin, several attempts have been made by Congress to provide legis-
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Countless shippers, who in light of Maislin have at least temporarily lost their immunity from undercharge liability, desperately
seek congressional action. The ICC has attempted to estimate the
total potential magnitude of this liability, and has predicted a
"conservative" figure of $27 billion.95 Not surprisingly, shippers
eagerly support measures to repeal the filed rate doctrine.' Elimination of section 10761(a)'s filed rate requirement would result in
the disappearance of billions of dollars in undercharges. Only one
rate of any consequence would exist-the one negotiated by a
carrier and a shipper. As there would be no higher filed rates,
"undercharges" would no longer exist.
The solution to the shippers' woes certainly appears simple-have Congress repeal the filed rate doctrine so that ordinary
contract law may govern the motor carrier industry, and allow
carriers and shippers to rely on privately negotiated rates. However, pressure by the powerful Teamsters Union, which opposes repeal of the filed rate doctrine, has prevented Congress from helping the shippersY The Union's primary concern is the welfare of
its members-workers who lose jobs as a result of bankruptcies in
the motor carrier industry.98 Any legislative attempt to mitigate
the harshness of undercharge liability will continue to be met with
fierce opposition from the Teamsters, because these charges represent the primary source of income that can be used to subsidize
unemployed union workers' pension funds. Elimination of the filed

lative relief from the undercharge claims. See, e.g., S.1675, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991);
H.R 4406, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
95. Shulz, supra note 9, at 31. A significant percentage of the $27 billion is directly
attributable to the claims being filed by bankruptcy trustees of some of the nation's
largest trucking companies. Lloyd Whitaker, for example, the trustee for PIE Trucking

Company, has sent out nearly $700 million in balance due bills to former shipping clients. Recently, Whitaker has filed new undercharge claims at a rate of one thousand a
week. 60 Minutes: You're Kiddingl, transcript at 20 (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 4,

1992).
96. William Augello, Vice President of the Transportation Claims and Prevention
Council, "called the filed-rate doctrine an 'anachronism,' and added: 'it is unworkable,
impracticable and inequitable ... It has no place in today's transportation regulatory
regime."' John D. Shulz, Shippers Beset by Undercharges Urge Repeal of "Filed-Rate"

Doctrine, TRAFFIC WORLD, Mar. 16, 1992, at 20, 20 (omission in original).
97. Augello reluctantly observed that "[t]he Teamsters union can single-handedly stop
any piece of legislation in this country." Id.at 21.
98. More than 100,000 Teamsters lost jobs when trucking companies filed for bankruptcy. Owed millions of dollars in back pay and pension benefits, they see the undercharge bills as the only chance they have of ever receiving the money. 60 Minutes:

You're Kidding!, supra note 95, at 22.
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rate doctrine would signal the immediate evaporation of all $27
billion worth of undercharges; therefore, until a compromise is
developed that takes into account the very desperate situation of
Teamsters Union members, shippers' lobbying efforts will continue
to be unsuccessful. 99 "
No longer shielded by the protective cloak of the unreasonable practice defense and faced with the distinct possibility of
perpetual congressional inaction, shippers recognize that the legitimacy of their final defense is about to be tested. The concept of
rate reasonableness has always been a mainstay of the statutory
framework and judicial opinions that drive motor carrier regulation. Now the reasonable rate principle takes on added significance-without it, shippers have no means of shielding themselves
from $27 billion of liability. It is up to the Supreme Court to determine whether such a protective device is warranted.

III. RATE REASONABLENESS REVISITED:
STRUCTURING A VALID DEFENSE

The Maislin decision has had a profound impact on the way
circuit courts are handling undercharge litigation.1" Although
Maislin simplified one aspect of the undercharge issue by holding

that shippers cannot seek refuge behind an unreasonable practice
defense,1"' it rapidly has become evident to the circuit courts
that other difficult questions-concerning the unreasonable rate de-

99. One possible solution is that offered by the Coalition for an Undercharge Relief
Bill (CURB), which is attempting to garner support for a proposal that would limit the
number of shipments susceptible to undercharge claims. Essentially, CURB offers a compromise-appease the shippers by decreasing the exorbitant level of undercharge claims
while still providing the Teamsters Pension Fund with the means to protect its unemployed union members. Carrier-ShipperRoundtable Focuses on Undercharges, Regulation,
TRAFFIC WoRLD, Apr. 20, 1992, at 15, 15.
100. A majority of the undercharge cases that are presently before district and circuit
courts initially entered the judicial system prior to the Court's decision in Maislin. Most
of these disputes began with referral to the ICC on unreasonable practice grounds over
two and a half years ago.
101. With a quick cite to Maislin, district and circuit courts were able to dismiss
shippers' unreasonable practice defenses. See, e.g., Delta Traffic Serv. v. Appco Paper &
Plastics Corp., 931 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1991); Lovett v. Honeywell, Inc., 930 F.2d 625,
627-28 (8th Cir. 1991); West Coast Truck Lines v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 912 F.2d 1130,
1131 (9th Cir. 1990); Delta Traffic Serv. v. Transtop, Inc., 902 F.2d 112 (1st Cir. 1992),
modifying 902 F.2d 101 (1st Cir. 1990); Horn's Motor Express v. Harrisburg Paper Co.,
765 F. Supp. 211, 212-13 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Overland Express v. International Multifoods,
765 F. Supp. 1386, 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
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fense-still must be resolved."° ICC and Supreme Court recognition of the importance of rate reasonableness does not automatically justify an unreasonable rate defense. By definition, such a
defense requires the ICC to address questions of rate reasonableness prior to a court's ruling on the merits 'of an undercharge
claim.
A dispute concerning the validity of an unreasonable rate
defense does not necessarily center on whether rate reasonableness
is an important aspect of motor carrier regulation. In fact, carriers
could concede the importance of such a requirement while still
contending that it is inappropriate to make such determinations
prior to the settling of the undercharge claims. Consequently, the
remainder of this Note focuses on the key questions that must be
asked when evaluating the legitimacy of a rate reasonableness
defense. First, courts must decide whether a determination of rate
reasonableness falls within the primary jurisdiction of the ICC.
Second, courts need to determine whether the staying of district
court proceedings and the subsequent referral of rate reasonableness disputes to the ICC are appropriate, or whether rate reasonableness determinations should only be made in separate reparations proceedings. If a referral mechanism is found appropriate,
then courts may find it necessary to develop certain standards to
evaluate whether a shipper's unreasonableness claim is, in fact,
worthy of referral. An application of such precepts would provide
the unreasonable rate defense with a type of flexibility that the
unreasonable practice defense has never had.
A. Primary Jurisdiction Concerns
A shipper's ability to have the ICC evaluate its unreasonable
rate defense prior to a district court's judgment on the undercharge claim is inextricably tied to whether the courts consider
rate reasonableness determinations to be within the ICC's primary
jurisdiction. 3 The Supreme Court regards the "maintenance of a

102.

Justice Brennan's tenth footnote, providing for the exploration of rate reasonable-

ness on remand, Maislin Indus., U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2767 n.10
(1990), immediately became the focus of the shippers' and courts' attention. See, eg.,
Duffy v. BMC Indus., 938 F.2d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1991); Lovett, 930 F.2d at 628; Orr v.
ICC, 912 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1990); Covey v. ConAgra, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 479,
480-81 (D. Colo. 1991).
103.

"Primary jurisdiction is invoked in situations where the courts have jurisdiction

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:905

proper relationship between the courts and the Commission in
matters affecting transportation policy to be of continuing public
concern";" and therefore, when claims "have been placed within
the special competence of an administrative body ...

the judicial

process [must be] suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its views.""1 5 The Court has recognized
that the evaluation of tariff rates falls specifically within the primary jurisdiction of regulatory agencies.) °
In defining the discrete roles of the judiciary and of administrative agencies, the Court has concerned itself with which body
could more effectively handle a given dispute. Recognizing that a
body of experts is best-equipped to make rate reasonableness
determinations," and hoping that such determinations could be
made uniformly,"° the Court has held that the ICC should be
the first entity to consider the reasonableness issue. In United
States v. Morgan,"° the Court emphasized the importance of co-

ordinated action by the courts and the agency, neither of which
should "be regarded as wholly independent and unrelated instrumentalities of justice, each acting in the performance of its preover the claim from the very outset but it is likely thaf the case will require resolution
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed in the hands of an administrative body." Marshall v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1373, 1376 (10th Cir.
1989) (citations omitted).
104. United States v. Western Pac. 1MR. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956).
105. Id. at 64.
106. Se4 e.g., Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290, 304 (1976) (recognizing that
the primary jurisdiction doctrine has been applied when "an action otherwise within the
jurisdiction of the court raises a question of the validity of the rate . .. included in a
tariff filed with an agency") (citations omitted). The origins of referring rate reasonableness claims to the ICC can be traced back seventy years. See Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922) (determining that the ICC must first
be consulted when a rate is charged with being unreasonable or discriminatory); see also
Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 325 (1981) (holding
that the ICC has the exclusive right to determine reasonableness).
107. These determinations are "reached ordinarily upon voluminous and conflicting
evidence . . . [and an] adequate appreciation of ... many intricate facts of transportation ... ." Great Northern Ry., 259 U.S. at 291.
108. "Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are secured . . . by preliminary resort .. . to agencies that are better
equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by
more flexible procedure." Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75
(1952); see also Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184,
196 (1913) (describing the vesting of power "in a single body, so as to secure uniformity
and to prevent the varying and sometimes conflicting results that would flow from the
different views of the same facts that might be taken by different tribunals").
109. 307 U.S. 183 (1939).
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scribed statutory duty without regard to the appropriate function
of the other in securing the plainly indicated objects of the statute."110 Keeping with this principle of coordinated action, some

district courts require shippers to make an initial showing of unreasonableness to the district court prior to the invocation of the

ICC's primary jurisdiction."' Where shippers "must make a
threshold showing that the ICC could find the filed rates unreasonable" to justify referral," the courts can still influence the
manner by which shippers attempt to prove a given rate unreason113
able. In Atlantis Express v. Standard Transportation Services,

for example, the court granted referral to the ICC only after it
had determined that the shipper's attack on the reasonableness of
the carrier's rates consisted of more than just an empty assertion.
The shipper in that case had rooted its claim of unreasonableness
in a series of concrete factors.1 4

110. Id. at 191 (emphasis added). As expressed in Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94 (1915), the "plainly indicated object" of the ICA was to prevent
unjust discrimination in interstate commerce by requiring strict adherence to filed rates
"unless . .. found by the Commission to be unreasonable." Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
Securing the plainly indicated object of the ICA, therefore, requires that the ICC and
courts coordinate their efforts. The courts determine whether § 10761(a)'s filed rate requirement is fulfilled, and the Commission establishes the reasonableness of the rate. To
properly effectuate transportation regulatory policies, "neither can rightly be regarded by
the other as an alien intruder . . . ." Morgan, 307 U.S. at 191.
111. Se4 e.g., Covey v. ConAgra, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 479, 482 (D. Colo. 1991). This
requirement, by prohibiting shippers from merely asserting unreasonableness, prevents
abuse of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. See United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co.,
352 U.S. 59, 68-69 (1956) ("[T]he mere fact that the issue is phrased . . . as a matter of
reasonableness should not be determinative on the jurisdictional issue. To hold otherwise
would make the doctrine of primary jurisdiction an abstraction to be called into operation at the whim of the pleader.").
112. Atlantis Express v. Standard Transp. Servs., 955 F.2d 529, 537 (8th Cir. 1992);
see also Branch Motor Express Co. v. Caloric Corp., No. 89-1130, slip op. at 4 (3d Cir.
Aug. 14, 1990) (The "mere mention of rate unreasonableness, entirely unsupported even
now, is not sufficient to give [the shipper] a second bite at the apple."); Oneida Motor
Freight v. Ormond Shops, 126 B.R. 431, 442 (D.N.L 1991) ("[I]n order to merit referral
of a matter to the ICC, a shipper must provide more than a bald, conclusory allegation
of rate reasonableness."); Covey, 763 F. Supp. at 481 (rejecting the idea that a shipper
"simply by mouthing the magic words, 'unreasonable rate,' wins an automatic trip to the
ICC").
113. 955 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1992).
114. Factors applied by the ICC on a case-by-case basis to determine rate reasonableness include: "(a) relevant rate comparisons, (b) a carrier's proffer of a particular rate,
(c) whether the rate would have moved the traffic had it been assessed at the time the
shipment took place, (d) the class rates for like traffic, and (e) tariff analysis." Petition
for Issuance of Rate Reasonableness and Unreasonable Practices Policy Statement, 3 Fed.
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B. Referral v. Reparations
Although Supreme Court precedent suggests that rate reasonableness determinations fall within the primary jurisdiction of the
ICC, the circuits are split as to whether the Commission should
make such evaluations before or after the conclusion of district
court proceedings.115 The most common question that courts face
regarding the rate reasonableness issue is whether shippers should
assert unreasonable rate claims as defenses to carriers' undercharge
actions or as independent claims in separate, subsequent, reparations actions.1 6 The referral versus reparations dispute is the
Carr. Rep. (CCH)
37,909, at 47,421 (ICC 1991). Atlantis specifically referred to the
submission of "an extensive comparison of rates between [sic] Atlantis and other 'healthy'
carriers that offered the same or similar services in the same territory during the same
time period." 955 F.2d at 537-38 (citation omitted). Evidence that a carrier's rates exceeded competitors' rates has been found sufficient to warrant referral to the ICC. See,
e.g., Bergquist v. 724 Freight Sales (In re Sharm Express), 122 B.R. 999, 1004-05 (D.
Minn. 1991) (finding that referral to the ICC is warranted based on shipper's assertion
that carrier charged fifty percent more then competitors; the court inferred that, because
it can be presumed that the competitors were earning a profit at the significantly lower
rate, the carrier's rates were unreasonably high); Horn's Motor Express v. Anchor Glass
Container, No. 1:CV-90-1030, 1991 WL 124621, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 1991) (determining that evidence of carrier's negotiated rates being half of its filed rate and information indicating that other shippers would have shipped goods over the same route for a
substantially lower price than the carrier's rate is sufficient to justify referral to the ICC).
115. This division regarding the appropriate time for administrative consideration of
rate reasonableness defenses was firmly established prior to Maislin. Compare Delta Traffic Serv. v. Transtop, Inc., 902 F.2d 101 (1st Cir. 1990) (permitting administrative challenge to carrier's presumably reasonable rates prior to payment of undercharge), modified
by 902 F.2d. 112 (1st Cir. 1992) with Supreme Beef Processors v. Yaquinto (In re Caravan Refrigerated Cargo), 864 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3254
(1990) (prohibiting administrative challenge prior to payment). Although the Fifth
Circuit's position prevailed in Maislin, it was only a partial victory. Caravan held that
"[a] shipper that pleads unreasonableness. as a defense cannot prevent enforcement of the
filed tariff doctrine or force the district court to stay proceedings and refer the case to
the Commission." 864 F.2d at 392. The Maislin Court agreed with Caravan only on that
court's evaluation of the unreasonable practice defense. The Court did not hold that
courts were prohibited from referring all unreasonableness defenses (including those addressing carriers' rates) to the ICC. Consequently, when a new undercharge case came
before the Fifth Circuit in the summer of 1992, a panel of judges different from that
which had decided Caravan issued an opinion that provided for the assertion of a reasonableness defense. See Advance United Expressways v. Eastman Kodak Co., 965 F.2d
1347, 1352 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that, in light of Maislin, shippers may assert rate
unreasonableness as a defense and that district courts should refer such defenses to the
ICC).
116. See, -e.g., Duffy v. BMC Indus., 938 F.2d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1991); Covey v.
ConAgra, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 479, 484 (D. Colo. 1991). The Second Circuit argued that
Maislin created much of the uncertainty surrounding the appropriateness of referral to
the ICC. See Duffy, 938 F.2d at 355 (noting an apparent contradiction between Maislin's
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most significant wrinkle in current undercharge litigation; its resolution hinges on an interpretation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.117 Circuit courts have expressed great concern about the
effect a general referral or reparations policy would have on the
shipper and carrier in particular, and the motor carrier industry in
general. The First Circuit, for example, concluded that a referral
system requiring the staying of district court proceedings is consistent with primary jurisdiction policies: "To stay the instant collection action, pending ICC determination of the tariffs' reasonableness, will not preclude eventual collection of any filed rate; it
is not inequitable... [and] will permit decisionmaking by the
expert body .. ..",11Most important, a system that refers rate

emphasis on strict adherence to filed rates and the escape-hatch made available by footnote 10's allowance for the exploration of rate reasonableness on remand).
117. One of the most common mistakes found in the literature is the treatment of
this dispute as a Chevron-based issue rather than as a problem that must be solved according to primary jurisdiction principles. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court articulated a standard of
review for an agency's interpretation of its governing statute: Where Congress has not
spoken directly to the question at issue, the Court will uphold an agency's interpretation
if it "is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843. In instances
where the Court has clearly expressed its opinion as to the meaning of a statute, it is no
longer appropriate to provide the administrative agency with Chevron freedom. Many
commentators refuse to see Maislin as anything but a Chevron case. See, eg., Dennis L.
Murphy, Comment, Maislin Industries, U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc- What Happened to
Deference?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 627, 638 (1991) ("Since Maislin reviews an administrative agency decision, Chevron is the appropriate standard for reviewing that decision. . . ."). Maislin, however, established an exception to the deference normally afforded an administrative agency "where the agency's interpretation of statutory language conflicts with well established Supreme Court precedents." International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
ICC, 921 F.2d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Maislin, 110 S. Ct. at 2768). Specifically,
the Maislin Court held that "once we have determined a statute's clear meaning, we
adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an
agency's later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute's
meaning." Maislin Indus., U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2768 (1990). For
example, the Court established the ICA's clear meaning in the early twentieth century:
To prevent unreasonable discrimination in the motor carrier industry, the shipper and
carrier must adhere to those rates on file with the ICC unless the Commission declares
them unreasonable. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
Probably no better evidence exists that undercharge litigation is not Chevron-driven
than the briefs filed in Reiter v. Cooper by shipper, carrier, and amicus interests. See,
e.g., Brief for Respondent, Reiter v. Cooper, decision pending (U.S. 1993) (No. 91-1496);
Reply Brief for Petitioners, Reiter v. Cooper, decision pending (U.S. 1993) (No. 91-1496);
Brief of Amici National Industrial Transportation League (NITL), Reiter v. Cooper, decision pending (U.S. 1993) (No. 91-1496) (none of which make even a passing reference to
Chevron).
118. Delta Traffic Serv. v. Transtop, Inc., 902 F.2d 101, 106 (1st Cir. 1990), modified
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reasonableness to the ICC directly protects shippers from paying
potentially unreasonable rates until after a determination is made
concerning the reasonableness of those rates."'.
Sometimes, appellate courts, not sure of whether to adopt a
referral or reparations system, stay district court proceedings and
refer the rate reasonableness issue to the ICC. In Duffy v. BMC
Industies,W the Second Circuit confronted a carrier that did not
attempt to collect the undercharge until after the shipper's twoyear reparations remedy, as delineated in 49 U.S.C. § 11706(c)(2),
had expired." Because a three-year limitations period governs
carriers' undercharge claims,1" preclusion of the shipper's unreasonable rate defense in Duffy would have effectively barred the
shipper from ever being able to protect itself against potentially
unreasonable rates."z The Second Circuit, although not prepared
to settle the broad issue of referral versus reparations, chose to
refer this particular case to the ICC, implicitly reaffirming the view
that a referral mechanism is appropriate, at least under certain
circumstances. 24
Those courts that seek to prohibit referral mechanisms and to
limit shippers to reparations actions"z find the greatest support
in T.I.M.E., Inc. v. Unitbd .States.12 The T.I.M.E. Court held that
shippers have no right to assert a reasonableness defense, and that
neither the ICC nor the Court has the power to question the
reasonableness of common carriers' past filed rates.Y The most

by 902 F.2d 112 (1st Cir. 1992).
119. Id. Decisions such as Advance United Expressways v. Eastman Kodak Co., 965
F.2d 1347, 1353 (5th Cir. 1992), suggest that only in instances in which "the district court
finds that it can resolve the issues before it, using the plain language of the tariffs and
the ordinary rules of construction, should the court then proceed to resolve the issues
without referral to the Commission."
120.
121.

938 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 357.

122. 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a) (1988).
123. 938 F.2d at 357-58.
124. See also Atlantis Express v. Standard Transp. Servs., 955 F.2d 529, 536 (8th Cir.
1992) (recognizing the validity of the unreasonable rate defense in the limited context of
parties agreeing to a negotiated rate and a shipper not having an adequate reparations
remedy at the time of the undercharge litigation).
125. The right of reparations against carriers that charge unreasonable rates is found
in 49 U.S.C. §§ 11705(b)(3) and 11706(c)(2) (1988). In addition, under § 11705(b)(2), if
the ICC finds a rate unreasonable, the Commission is authorized to order the carrier to
pay the shipper damages for overcharges.
126. 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
127. Id. at 470-72.
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important feature of the T.I.M.E. decision was the Court's unwillingness to provide shippers with an unreasonableness defense,
which sparked congressional legislation that provided shippers with
the right to seek reparations against common carriers who had
imposed unreasonable rates.1" Noting that the congressionally
enacted reparations proceedings would provide shippers with protection from unreasonable undercharge payments, the Fifth Circuit
held in In re Caravan Refrigerated Cargo1" that shippers must
first pay the undercharges and only afterwards, in a separate proceeding, seek determinations from the ICC that the rates were
unreasonable 30
The First Circuit challenged this "no referral" rule in Delta
Traffic Service v. Transtop, Inc. 131 The court distinguished future
rates from historic rates, noting that earlier Supreme Court decisions limited shippers to reparations when the disputes concerned
rates not yet paid, but provided protection for shippers when carriers sought to collect existing undercharges. Again, the fact that
so many of these carriers had gone bankrupt strongly influenced
the court. Barring referral for ICC review of previously paid historic rates would increase the chances that shippers would be
unable to protect themselves adequately by utilizing the ICA's
reparations mechanism. Transtop maintained that referral procedures, although possibly not appropriate in all filed rate disputes,
should be accepted when the undercharge is measured off of a
historic rate.
The Second Circuit developed a middle ground between the
shipper-favored referral system and the carrier-prefered reparations
regime in Delta Traffic Service v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. 2 Although it held that the ICC should determine the reasonableness
of the filed rate prior to carrier collection of the undercharge, 3 3
the Second Circuit chose not to vacate the district court's decision
to award the carrier the underpayment." Instead, the court required that the shipper's payments "be made to the district court

128. The provision is now codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 11705(b)(3) and 11705(c)(2).
129. Supreme Beef Processors v. Yaquinto (In re Caravan Refrigerated Cargo), 864
F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3254 (1990).
130. Id. at 391-92.
131. 902 F.2d 101 (1st Cir. 1990), modified by 902 F.2d 112 (1st Cir. 1992).
132. 936 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1991).
133. Id. at 66.
134. Id.
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and retained there until the ICC has decided how much, if any,
'
should be repaid ... by way of reparation."135
The court reasoned that if Georgia-Pacific were left merely to seek reparations
after it paid the undercharge to the carrier, little chance existed
that the shipper would ever receive any money.1" Impounding
all payments made by the shipper, pending resolution of the rate
reasonableness issue by the ICC, offered something for both sides.
First, carriers were assured that fundi for undercharge payments
would be available even if the ICC took its time considering the
reasonableness of the rates.137 Second, because a majority of the
carriers seeking collection of undercharges have been bankrupt
since the mid-1980s, impounding the funds assured shippers that
monies would be available for reparations.
C. Evaluating the Appropriateness of Rate Reasonableness
Defenses
It is somewhat of a misnomer to use the term "referral" when
describing what shippers seek in the post-Maislin environment.
Although shippers such as Primary Steel initially raised alternative
defenses to the carriers' undercharge claims, the ICC-fully confident of the unreasonable practice defense-never addressed rate
reasonableness.1" Often, the reason why the ICC made no finding on rate reasonableness was because the shipper-suffering
from similar overconfidence-did not pursue the issue before the
ICC on referral.3 Consequently, shippers' requests for the ICC
to consider rate reasonableness defenses after June 1990 amount
to requests for re-referral. Uncomfortable with the game-playing
quality of such maneuvering, some district courts have searched for
ways to limit shippers' ability to undermine the filed rate
doctrine's regulatory structure while still allowing shippers to question the reasonableness of carriers' rates." By applying the fol135.

Id.

136. The court noted that the carrier's Chapter 11 debtor status raised questions as to
its ability to comply with a reparations order in the future. Id.
137. Taking too much time to render a decision could be a disservice to the shipper,
however, because an unreasonable delay by the ICC would enable the carrier to petition
the district court for earlier release of the undercharge award. Id.

138. See, e.g., supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Branch Motor Express Co. v. Caloric Corp., No. 89-1130, slip op. at 3
(3d Cir. Aug. 14, 1990) (observing that no evidence had been provided by the shipper to

support its contention that Branch's rates were unreasonable).
140.

See, e.g., Oneida Motor Freight v. Ormond Shops, Inc., 126 B.R. 431, 437 (D.N.J.
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lowing qualifications to the rate reasonableness defense, the Reiter
Court would be developing the type of compromise that both
carriers and shippers could find palatable.
The first task of any court that considers granting re-referral
to the ICC on the basis of a shipper's unreasonable rate claim is
to distinguish between referral on the grounds of rate reasonableness and practice reasonableness. 14' Because the Maislin opinion
condemned only one of these defenses, some courts have found it
necessary to remind shippers and carriers of the distinctions between the two defenses. In Branch Motor Express Co. v. Caloric
Corp.,42 the Third Circuit acknowledged that the two defenses
are independent of one another: "In principle, a shipper could
have claimed both that it had a negotiated deal at a rate lower
than the filed rate, and also that the filed rate was so high, in
light of the carrier's cost, etc., as to be unreasonable under
§ 10701(e)." 143 Such a pronouncement makes clear the principle
that an unreasonable rate defense can continue to operate despite
the rejection of an unreasonable practice defense.
Because the two defenses are distinguishable, merely defining
one in terms of the other could potentially cause the already prohibited unreasonable practice defense to engulf the unreasonable
rate defense. In Atlantis Express v. Standard Transportation Services,'" the Eighth Circuit correctly preempted shippers from
masking unreasonable practice defenses in the guise of unreasonable rate defenses by noting that "if the ICC were to find a filed
rate unreasonable simply because the carrier had negotiated a
lower rate[,] ...
the filed rate doctrine [would] be under-

1991). The court pointed out that the shipper never sought reconsideration or appeal
after the ICC failed to address the issue of rate reasonableness when the case was initially referred to the Commission. Id. Only after Maislin struck down the Negotiated
Rates policy-and with it the shippers' hopes of avoiding the undercharge with an unreasonable practice defense-did the shippers begin to grumble about the fact that the unreasonableness of the rates had not been considered.
141. See eg., Atlantis Express v. Standard Transp. Servs., 955 F.2d 529 (8th Cir.
1992). The Eighth Circuit, not wanting the Atlantis decision to meet the same fate as its
earlier Maislin opinion, 879 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990), distinguished between unreasonable rate and practice defenses. "[U]nlike the ICC policy overturned in Maislin, the ability to challenge the reasonableness of filed rates in an action
to collect rate undercharges does not render nugatory the filed rate doctrine." 955 F.2d
at 537 (citations omitted).
142. No. 89-1130 (3d Cir. Aug. 14, 1990).
143. Id., slip op. at 4.
144. 955 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1992).
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mined."145 Therefore, the mere fact that carrier and shipper have
negotiated a lower rate is not sufficient evidence of a tariff rate's
unreasonableness. 1" Requiring evidence of a given rate's unreasonableness, beyond a mere showing that the filed rate is higher
than the negotiated rate, is one measure that courts can employ to
keep the unreasonable rate and unreasonable practice defenses
distinct. Consequently, to standardize the procedures for referring
rate reasonableness to the ICC, the Reiter Court should implement
a bright-line rule. Under such a rule, requests for referral of rate
reasonableness defenses that are based on nothing more than a
claim that the tariff rate is unreasonable in light of lower negotiated rates would be summarily denied, while those rate reasonableness defenses that make a good-faith attempt to consider the types
of factors the ICC considers relevant in such circumstances would
be granted. 47
In addition to requiring more specificity in the shipper's rate
reasonableness claim, the Reiter Court should attempt to measure
the sincerity of the shipper's claim prior to granting referral on
rate reasonableness grounds. One method involves restricting the
shipper's rate reasonableness defense to the record created in the
initial proceedings before the ICC.1 I In many instances, such a
policy provides a good indication of how unreasonable the shipper
145. Id. at 537; cf. Oneida Motor Freight v. Ormond Shops, Inc., 126 B.R. 431, 442

(D.NJ. 1991) (holding that "a party seeking referral to the ICC must substantiate a
challenge to the reasonableness of a filed rate so as to render it more than a bare allegation").
146. See Covey v. ConAgra, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 479, 482 n.2 (D. Colo. 1991); see also

Branch Motor, slip op. at 3-4 (where the only evidence presented as to rate unreasonableness was the difference between the filed and negotiated rates, referral to the ICC
would not be granted). But cf. Overland Express v. International Multifoods, 765 F.
Supp. 1386, 1387-88 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (noting that while substantial similarity among nego-

tiated rates of several carriers does not necessarily prove a filed rate's unreasonableness,
it does lend support to a showing of the negotiated rate's economic soundness and compliance with 49 U.S.C. § 10701(e) (1988)).
147. See supra note 114. The Court will have an opportunity to clarify the rate reasonableness defense this Term. See Cooper v. Delaware Valley Shippers (In re Carolina
Motor Express), 949 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub nom. Reiter v. Cooper,
112 S. Ct. 1934 (No. 91-1496).
148. Oneida, 126 B.R. at 443. The court considered any failure by shippers not to
have litigated fully their rate reasonableness defenses to be "wholly unjustified." Id. But
see Bergquist v. 7/24 Freight Sales (In re Sharm Express), 122 B.R. 999, 1005 (D. Minn.
1991) (detailing shipper's position that it was not unreasonable not to present rate reasonableness prior to Maislin since such a defense "requires different and more technical
evidence than the unreasonable practice defense . . . [and] would have been time-con-

suming, costly and superfluous").
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actually considered the rates. Presumably, a shipper who believed

it was truly paying unreasonable rates would have provided such
information at the first available chance.149
A third means of evaluating the legitimacy of a shipper's

unreasonable rate defense is to consider the timeliness of the
request for referral on the unreasonable rate issue. It was only
because the Maislin Court rejected the unreasonable practice defense that the issue of rate reasonableness arose. Because shippers

may have avoided full development of their rate reasonableness
50 courts may find
defenses for strategic reasons prior to Maislin,"
what the parties did immediately following Maislin to be of par-

ticular interest.'5 ' Courts are more likely to limit referral to the
ICC when the shipper never asserted a rate reasonableness de-

fense during the initial litigation. A judge can quickly distinguish
between a shipper such as Primary Steel, which made a good faith
effort to develop a timely unreasonable rate defense, 52 and one
which only decided to assert the defense after the unreasonable

practice theory had been eliminated by Maislin 53 Timeliness
considerations provide a further means of evaluating the sincerity
of a shipper's unreasonable rate defense."

In addition to being concerned about the sincerity and timeliness of shippers' defenses, the Reiter Court could limit the reach

of shippers' rate reasonableness claims by empowering district
court judges to evaluate the merits of the defenses on a case-by-

149. In Branch Motor, the court refused to grant the shipper's request for referralbelieving that the shipper had merely switched to an unreasonable rate defense after the
Maislin decision foreclosed its negotiated rates-unreasonable practice defense. Slip op. at
3.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
151. Compare In re Sharm, 122 B.R. at 1005 (observing that within two weeks of
Maislin, the carrier moved the ICC to reopen proceedings and to permit new evidence
regarding the rate reasonableness defense) with Oneida, Inc., 126 B.R. at 437 (noting that
the affidavits and exhibits presented by the defendants in support of their rate reasonableness defense actually spoke more to the reasonableness of the carrier's practices).
152. See, e.g., Maislin Indus., U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 1990 WL 264536, at *2
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 1990) ("A review of the record in the instant case convinces this
Court that Primary Steel clearly pled the reasonableness claim in this Court and presented that issue to the ICC for determination on reference from this Court.").
153. See, e.g., Delta Traffic Serv. v. Appco Paper & Plastics Corp., 931 F.2d 5, 7 (2d
Cir. 1991) ("[U]nlike the carrier in Maislin, Oneida never properly asserted a defense of
rate unreasonableness and has failed to advance a persuasive basis for its interposition at
this late date.").
154. See, e.g., id. (declining "to remand to the district court for consideration of a defense which has been raised for the first time on appeal").
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case basis. Rather than placing an absolute bar on the use of the
unreasonable rate defense, as the Maislin Court did to the unreasonable practice defense, the Reiter Court should qualify the use of
the rate reasonableness defense by enabling the lower courts to
determine whether the defense is worthy of referral to the ICC.
Having lower courts initially consider the legitimacy of unreasonable rate defenses does not severely infringe on the ICC's primary
jurisdiction. Rather, the courts would be serving a useful prescreening function, by separating legitimate defenses that are worthy of referral from those that are not. The unreasonable rate
defense's legitimacy could be measured by determining whether
the unreasonable rate defense is more than just a reworded unreasonable practice defense.
The unreasonable rate defense took center stage in the Fourth
Circuit's 1991 Cooper v. Delaware Valley Shippers decision. 55
The scenario was the familiar one: a motor carrier, Carolina Motor
Express (CMX), provided transportation services to shippers at privately negotiated rates; shippers believed that those rates would be
filed with the ICC; shippers paid the negotiated rates in full, incorrectly assuming that CMX's rates had been published; CMX filed
for bankruptcy, and an auditor discovered the undercharge; the
bankruptcy trustee filed suit on behalf of CMX to recover the
difference between the collected negotiated rate and the applicable
filed rate.156 Realizing that an unreasonable practice defense
would be of no assistance in the post-Maislin environment, defendants argued that referral to the ICC should be granted to determine whether the carrier's filed rates were reasonable.5 ' The validity of rate reasonableness determinations, in general, was not
disputed in Cooper." Rather, the court divided on the same
question that had created a split between the First and Fifth Circuits:" 9' "whether the shippers should be allowed to dispute the

155. Cooper v. Delaware Valley Shippers (In re Carolina Motor Express), 949 F.2d
107 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub nom. Reiter v. Cooper, 112 S. Ct. 1934 (1992) (No.

91-1496).
156. Id. at 109.
157. Id.
158. The Fourth Circuit, like so many other courts, see, e.g., Duffy v. BMC Indus.,
938 F.2d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1991); Orr v. ICC, 912 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1990); Oneida
Motor Freight v. Ormond Shops, Inc., 126 B.R. 431, 440-41 (D.NJ. 1991), recognized
that Maisln's tenth footnote supported the consideration of the rate reasonableness issue
on remand. 949 F.2d at 110.
159. See supra note 115.
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reasonableness of the rates in the context of the undercharge
action [through referral to the ICC], or whether their sole recourse
should be an independent reparations action under 49 U.S.C.
§ 11705(b)(3)." 16
The most interesting aspect of the Cooper decision involves
the Fourth Circuit's rationale for why a rate reasonableness defense should not stay district court proceedings. Writing for the
majority, Judge H. Emory Widener rejected a referral system,
believing that it "would provide a strong incentive for shippers
routinely to contest the validity of the carrier's rates in order to
delay paying the carrier's filed rate.""16 The court considered referral to be first and foremost a strategic ploy designed to circumvent the filed rate doctrine's requirement that carriers and shippers
strictly adhere to those rates on file with the ICC.'62
The Fourth Circuit correctly noted that the issue of a tariff
rate's reasonableness can be raised in a separate proceeding either
before or after the undercharge suit is filed, and that payment of
reparations is available to the shipper.'6 However, the mere existence of a reparations system which can theoretically protect a
shipper's interests does not justify the complete elimination of a
referral-based mechanism. To prevent excessive delay in rate reasonableness determinations and to eliminate unsubstantiated unreasonableness claims, the Cooper court should not have considered
that its only option was to limit shippers to reparations proceedings. If the court were genuinely concerned that the availability of
a referral system would promote abusive tactics on the part of
shippers, then it should have included a consideration of safeguards that would insulate the referral process from shippers' subversive actions: 64

160.

Cooper, 949 F.2d at 112 (Hall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(footnote omitted).
161. Id. at 110.
162. 49 U.S.C. § 10761(a) (1988); Louisville & Nashville

R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237
U.S. 94, 97 (1915). The Cooper majority-devoted to the reparations provisions afforded
under the ICA-"would give, automatic judgment to the trustee and make the shipper
pay a possibly unreasonable, unlawful and unenforceable rate." 949 F.2d at 113 n.3 (Hall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

163. Cooper, 949 F.2d at 110.
164. Judge Kenneth K. Hall, concurring in part and dissenting in part, was not prepared to abandon the referral process merely because it is potentially prone to abuse.
Instead, he contended that "a complaining shipper should be required to present a
threshold level of evidence of unreasonableness before referral is warranted . . . ." Id. at
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CONCLUSION

The most effective way to gain insight into the status of motor carrier regulation is to consider Maislin and the upcoming
Reiter decision jointly. In 1990, the Court commenced its most
recent analysis of the filed rate doctrine by evaluating the legitimacy of the ICC-engineered unreasonable practice defense. Two
years later, as part of the same dialogue, the Court is poised to
determine what role, if any, unreasonable rate defenses ought to
play in undercharge litigation. At first glance, it might appear that
Maislin's rejection of the Negotiated Rates policy would necessarily
entail treating rate reasonableness in a similar fashion. After all,
both defenses share a common purpose-limiting the ICA's mandate that carriers and shippers adhere to filed rates. Upon closer
examination, however, it becomes evident that rejection of the
unreasonable practice defense and acceptance of its unreasonable
rate counterpart are not necessarily inconsistent.
The unreasonable practice defense is an ICC construct. Although the text of section 10701(a) includes "practices" in its prohibition of unreasonableness, neither the language of the ICA nor
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the congressional enactment
forbids a carrier from collecting undercharges after it has already
collected lower, negotiated rates. In fact, Maislin represents the
first time the Court has even considered the reasonableness of
carriers' pricing practices. The principle that rates must be reasonable, however, has been-for over a hundred years-an integral
component of transportation regulatory policy. Maintaining the
reasonableness of carrier rates is necessary to ensure that
Congress's paramount purpose in regulating motor carriers-the
prevention of unjust discrimination-is preserved. The ICA, primarily through sections 10701(a) and 10701(e), articulates specific
means for evaluating reasonableness. Additionally, the Supreme
Court has always made rate reasonableness considerations an important part of its analysis of the filed rate doctrine. Analyzing the
reasonableness of carrier rates in the context of referral proceedings is most faithful to the statutory and judicial regime that has
dominated motor carrier regulation throughout the twentieth century. Only by ensuring that reasonableness determinations are
113. Similar stipulations--driven by the concern that claims of rate unreasonableness not
be mere allegations-have been announced by other courts. See supra notes 141-54 and
accompanying text.
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made prior to the exchange of any money will the Court be able
to guarantee that carriers and shippers will function under lawful
pricing schemes. The Maislin Court's elimination of shippers' unreasonable practice defense, when coupled with the Teamsters
Union's ability to thwart congressional attempts to repeal the filed
rate doctrine, has magnified the importance of the rate reasonableness defense.
Competing public policies, defined by the economic realities
that accompany undercharge litigation, make resolution of the
undercharge dilemma a difficult task.1" On the one hand, the
economic interests of unemployed workers in the motor carrier
industry must be considered. The $27 billion in potential undercharges represents the only hope these individuals have of ever
receiving back pay and pension benefits that evaporated when
their employers went bankrupt. On the other hand, shippers desperately seek the repeal of the antiquated filed rate doctrine. The
MCA, although deregulating the motor carrier industry, never
eliminated the filed rate doctrine. Consequently, shippers have
been unable to benefit from the application of ordinary contract
interpretation to the agreements they have formed with motor carriers. Instead, section 10761(a)'s requirement that the industry
operate exclusively under filed rates preserves the regulatory
scheme of another era; it thus keeps a $27-billion cloud looming
ominously over shippers' heads. For shippers, the overriding public
policy consideration is that their industry must be protected from
the undercharge claims, whether such protection comes from an
ICC-created policy prohibiting carriers from collecting the differ-

165.

Although beyond the scope of this Note, strong public policy concerns dictate

that the undercharge dilemma must not be resolved without also examining the issue of
which branch of the government should modify the filed rate doctrine's provisions. Is
government being faithful to time-honored separation of powers principles if, in the face

of an absolutely clear congressional enactment, it permits executive branch agencies to
create rules and regulations that abrogate the law? It is critical to ask whether administrative involvement in the resolution of undercharge litigation collapses the distinctions
made between the three branches of government. The ICC's Negotiated Rates policy

raised the distinct possibility that an administrative agency had gone beyond mere interpretation of its governing statute and crossed into the legislature's domain. For an infor-

mative discussion of the evolution of ICC carrier regulation, see generally RICHARD D.
STONE,

THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE

COMMISSION

AND

THE RAILROAD

INDUSTRY

100-94 (1991) (analyzing procedural, organizational, and philosophical changes within the

ICC over the past fifteen years).
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ence between. filed and negotiated rates, or from judicial protection from unreasonable rates.
Because of the Maislin decision, the ICC's alternative is no
longer an option. The unreasonable practice defense would have
effectively barred the collection of all undercharges because the
negotiation of a rate, followed by a carrier's attempt to collect the
difference between that rate and a higher filed rate, would, by
definition, have been illegitimate. Permitting an unreasonable rate
defense does not necessarily implicate the same type of all-ornothing scenario. Specifically, limitations can be placed on the
availability of such a defense that would prevent it from operating
as an absolute bar to carriers' claims. In the last two years, several
district and circuit courts have suggested qualifications that would
make an unreasonable rate defense compatible with the filed rate
doctrine." If the Reiter Court chooses to provide shippers with
a certain degree of protection from undercharge liability, it should
recognize that its options extend beyond the traditional, and somewhat inflexible, referral and reparations mechanisms. The Court
can apply any of the following series of tests to a proposed unreasonable rate defense to create a more flexible system:
(1) whether the record demonstrates that the shipper has offered
evidence suggesting that the rate is unreasonable for reasons
other than the fact that the tariff rate is significantly higher than
the negotiated rate (permitting a rate reasonableness defense
without other evidence would amount to implicit acceptance of
the unreasonable practice defense);
(2) whether the shipper's claim of rate unreasonableness appeals
to section 10701(e) market concerns rather than merely being a
bald assertion;
(3) whether limiting the shipper to the record created during
initial referral to the ICC on the unreasonable practice issue
would assist in determining the sincerity of a rate reasonableness
claim;
(4) whether the shipper's assertion of a rate reasonableness defense was timely (timeliness should be measured either by how
soon after Maislin's dismissal of the unreasonable practice defense the shipper offered new evidence to support the unreasonable rate claim or by a determination that the shipper did not
assert an unreasonable rate defense until after Maislin dismissed
the Negotiated Rates policy);
166. See supra notes 141-54 and accompanying text.
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(5) whether the shipper will have a reparations mechanism avail-

able to it if the rate reasonableness defense is disallowed (it is
possible that the carrier could be bringing the undercharge suit

after the two-year period available for reparations actions has
expired);
(6) whether requiring district court impoundment of the undercharge payment will provide the shipper with sufficient protection
in a subsequent reparations proceeding; and
(7) whether a rate reasonableness defense should be allowed at
least in a situation in which the carrier is bankrupt and collection
of reparations will be more difficult.
Permitting district courts to stay proceedings pending ICC
determination of rate reasonableness will not result in the death of
the filed rate doctrine. The unreasonable practice theory was agency-driven, and the Maislin Court correctly prevented the ICC from
abrogating the ICA. An unreasonable rate defense, on the other
hand, is driven by specific statutory provisions and clearly articulated Supreme Court precedent. Preservation of an unreasonable
rate defense and the continued existence of an overall regulatory
scheme are not mutually exclusive.

